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Abstract 
By focusing on three different national level women’s organisations in Bangladesh, this 
article looks at how the movements have used different strategies to become an 
effective voice for women’s interests and empowerment at civil society and state levels. 
The importance of framing their issues in a non-contentious way, building alliances with 
like-minded groups and the strength of personal networks can be clearly seen. Reaching 
out to these diverse groups has meant the organisations at times making strategic 
choices, which allowed the groups to create space and legitimacy for their agenda. 
Relying on personal networks is shown to carry certain risks for sustainability and their 
ineffective engagement with political parties can reduce their influence, but ultimately 
their strategies for mobilising support and building constituencies has gained these 
organisations greater legitimacy and strength as advocates of women’s issues. 
 
1. Introduction 
Women’s organisations are vehicles for women to collectively formulate and voice their 
demands for rights and empowerment to their community, society and the state. This 
article shows how in the last decade women’s organisations in Bangladesh became 
effective advocates of women’s interests and empowerment by negotiating their position 
and establishing their strength and legitimacy. They were able to further the gender 
justice agenda at various levels and achieve increased recognition for these demands 
and policy changes to ensure women’s rights. 
 
The 1990s were perceived by various women’s movements in Bangladesh to be a 
“golden age”: a time when there was scope for raising feminist issues with the state. The 
discourse around the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 and the 
resulting Platform for Action encouraged the state to enter into engagement with these 
actors. There was increasing recognition of such organisations as legitimate 
interlocutors. In addition the period of democratic transition beginning in 1990 meant that 
relations with the state were perhaps less confrontational. However, the state’s attitude 
to gender equity has been contradictory: at times enacting progressive laws, yet at 
others being distinctly patriarchal and acting to sustain male advantage (Jahan 1995). 
The state is built on a gender and class hierarchical structure and patron-client 
relationships are still the dominant form of social organisation (Goetz 2001; Nazneen 
2008a). Further, aid dependence and the politicisation of civil bureaucracy have severely 
undermined the capacity of the state. Almost all civil society organisations are polarised 
along party lines which undermines the capacity of the actors to articulate collective 
interests (Hassan 2002; Nazneen 2008b).  
 
It is within this context that this article explores how three national level women’s 
organisations mobilise various constituencies, including their own members, and 
negotiate with political parties, state bureaucracy and allies in civil society to achieve 
gender justice goals. In examining how Bangladesh Mahila Parishad, Naripokkho, and 
Women for Women mobilise various constituencies, our research focused on two 
processes: how they create support for their cause (‘activation of commitment’, Ryan 
1992) and how they create meaning around an issue. 
 
We argue that the manner in which the organisations studied package the issues 
selected by them and the strategies they use to engage with the state, political parties 
and civil society are influenced by: the nature of state and civil society relations; the 
incentives and costs incurred in promoting gender justice related issues; the strength of 
personal connections the organisations have with these actors; and the opportunities 
provided by the various developments in the international human and women’s rights 
arena. The contradictory positions of the Bangladeshi state on gender equity issues, aid 
dependence and politicisation of the civil bureaucracy have led the feminist 
organisations to engage with them in an opportunistic manner, seizing chances as they 
arise to further their cause. This behaviour is motivated by the need to maintain 
autonomy, legitimacy and dependence on personal connections to access state 
machinery. The organisations have generally tried to distance themselves from the 
political parties and not directly lobbied for their issues to be incorporated within the 
agenda set by them. This is due to the fear of losing autonomy and also legitimacy as a 
non partisan actor and that the organisations studied have failed to establish themselves 
as major players within the political system. Relations with civil society are based around 
mutual reciprocity, personal obligation, legitimacy concerns and asymmetrical power 
relations. In conclusion we reflect on the extent the strategies used served to define and 
broaden constituencies and were useful in ensuring the legitimacy of the cause and 
sustainability of the different movements. 
 
2. Case study organisations 
The three organisations chosen for the study – Women for Women (WFW), Naripokkho 
(NP) and Bangladesh Mahila Parishad (BMP) – are influential role models for other 
organisations, and the diversity of strategies they use for constituency building and 
mobilising provide interesting insights. Our research focused on one issue, selected by 
the organisations, which they were mobilising on, where they felt they had been 
successful.  
 
BMP was established in 1970 and is the largest women’s organisation in Bangladesh. It 
has a clear command structure with a hierarchical decision making and implementation 
process. It has strong links with leftist political parties. We analysed their work on the 
political empowerment of women. Demands have evolved over time but now include; the 
reservation of 100 parliamentary seats for women; increasing the numbers of women in 
decision-making bodies; political parties to ensure 33 per cent nominations of women for 
parliamentary elections; and to facilitate women’s involvement in local government.  
 
NP is a small organisation, formed in 1983, and committed to promoting women’s 
equality to transform existing unequal power relations. It has a participatory style of 
decision making. We analysed their campaign against acid violence. Key aims for them 
include changing social attitudes working on the cultural representation of women. They 
sought adequate treatment of women and to transform the perception of them from 
victims to survivors.  
 
Finally, WFW is the smallest of the organisations studied. It was established in 1983 and 
mainly focuses on policy advocacy. In the light of its long record of work on 
mainstreaming gender, it decided to mobilise around the implementation of the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). As part of 
the follow up of the Beijing conference, CEDAW was seen to be an instrument that 
would help the women’s movement in its attempt to make the state understand 
discrimination and its impacts and to reform its laws in the light of this.  
 3. Methods 
Our objective was to capture the diversity of strategies used by the selected women’s 
organisations for creating and mobilising support around particular issues. Our starting 
point was to explore the movement building process through the eyes of the activists. 
This is why a single issue was chosen for each organisation. As the research 
progressed, we realised that though these organisations were diverse, there were 
commonalities in the strategies they used. The commonalities indicate how structural 
factors influence organisational behaviour, which became a key research focus. 
 
The research process was reflexive, reiterative and action oriented. Action oriented 
because one objective of the research is to understand how the organisations build 
support and help them develop a more sophisticated analysis of the process (Cook and 
Fonow 1991). Each organisation selected issues where they felt they were successful in 
mobilising support. Since answers to the research questions required insider’s 
knowledge, open-ended interviews with key people was a major source of data 
collection. These were followed by further interviews and documentary analysis. 
Previous research on organisational history and construction of organisational timelines 
helped to contextualise these issues within the broader societal context. 
 
Our insider status (one of us is a member of NP and the other has connections with both 
BMP and WFW) helped us to gain access, create space for the interviewees to reflect 
freely, and build an easier rapport since we were seen as people with knowledge of the 
organisations and the feminist movement. But on the other hand, our outsider 
perspective as researchers and grounding our work theoretically helped us to use a 
different lens to reflect on the organisations’ actions and be aware of our own 
subjectivities.  
 
4. Packaging: ‘naming and framing’ the issues for mobilisation 
How an organisation packages or ‘names and frames’ an issue (Gamson 1975) plays a 
key role in building consensus among its members and allies. Naming and framing is 
influenced by the ideology of the organisation, the nature of its allies and supporters, and 
the type of emotion the organisation wants to evoke from its constituents (Taylor and 
Rupp 1991). Packaging has an influence over its success in building trust and solidarity 
amongst its members (Tarrow 1998). 
 
The organisations used different tactics in packaging their issues. The BMP framed the 
debate around women’s political participation in terms of “entitlement”. The emphasis for 
BMP’s core constituents of members and locally elected female representatives was that 
in order for women to enjoy equal economic and social rights they needed to participate 
equally in decision making. Barriers to women’s political empowerment were presented 
as an injustice. The emphasis on these aspects aimed to do the following: 
 
…[M]ake our members and women realise that unless women have the decision 
making power they will not be able to change their position in other areas such as 
economic and social… The women representatives are aware about their rights 
being denied. They cannot carry out their duties because of the discrimination they 
experience at the hand of their male colleagues and at the institutional level. It 
creates anger and frustration among them about the injustice. We are there to 
provide support and to create a general awareness among women about this 
injustice. (interview, BMP1, 14 July 2008) 
 
This injustice framing was crucial in building solidarity among members, representatives 
and women in general. These particular framing strategies were also used on other 
women’s organisations and civil society as there is very little disagreement amongst 
them on demands regarding this issue.  
 
However, for political parties and the state, BMP used more strategic methods by 
reminding them of their manifesto promises and highlighting gender biases within the 
political system. The BMP acts as a lobbying organisation on this issue because the 
major political parties do not share the same commitment to women’s political 
empowerment. However, they can be responsible if BMP can show the benefits of 
supporting this agenda. The reform of state agencies opened up a space for lobbying 
and the state executive branch is a key instrument for change. 
 
The results of this packaging have been mixed. BMP have been successful in 
consolidating support amongst members and, to some extent, civil society. The 
campaign has evolved and spread: the issue is now widely recognised. However, they 
have had less success with the state and political parties. Holding the parties to account 
for promises made has been difficult. The parties do not see any significant risk in terms 
of vote from reneging on these points. In addition, BMP have been unable to address the 
perceived political cost of opposition from within parties and the potential loss of seats to 
other parties due to increasing reserved seats for women. 
 
Naripokkho (NP) wanted to frame issues around the acid survivors’ movement in a way 
that would mean the survivors’ medical treatment, rehabilitation and justice needs are 
met by the state. But gender sensitive service delivery and justice are not the only goals 
they also want to create social awareness of the crime itself and want to evoke empathy 
with the survivors as people. Thus, NP framed the issue as a matter of social justice, 
stressing the suffering experienced by both survivor and their family and thereby 
creating space for and legitimating demands on health care and legal needs, but also on 
crime prevention. This framing emphasised the need to reflect on a society which gave 
rise to, enabled and tolerated such a heinous crime. 
 
NP deliberately tried to evoke empathy for and protectiveness towards the survivors 
among service providers in order to motivate them into creating an enabling 
environment. One NP activist explained:  
 
[O]ur target was to use emotions, and we used it to our advantage (advantage of 
the survivors), we encouraged the girls to speak out, to describe their traumas, 
pains, their family. It is difficult to ignore if you see it, if you hear it, if they are a 
person to you. (interview, NP2, 10 September 2008).  
 
Another reason for using this strategy was to circumvent the judgments made by these 
service providers about the survivors’ (usually young women) moral character. This was 
particularly useful in court where these issues were raised by the defence. One NP 
member detailed her strategy: 
 
If I had tried to challenge society’s views about who a good girl is I would have hit 
a wall! Instead I tried to use emotions. I argued that whether one was involved did 
not mean that she deserved to have acid thrown at her. Her misdemeanour does 
not match the treatment she received. That the defendant’s lawyer who is like her 
father/brother… should not be making such dirty insinuations... (Interview, NP3, 14 
September 2008)  
 
Since the stress was on evoking empathy for the survivors, NP did not confront the 
social definition of the acceptable behaviour of a ‘good girl’. Issues around adolescent 
romance and sexuality were explored with the survivors in “safe” environments, not 
necessarily in the public domain (interview, NP4, 2 December 2008). However, NP did 
try to link the decision of a young woman to say no to a romantic proposal or the right to 
end a relationship to issues around bodily integrity and reproductive rights. This was 
raised during rallies and meetings held on International Women’s Day and at other 
forums. The slogan used was ‘Shorir amar, shidhanto amar’ (My Body, My Choice).  
 
Women for Women (WFW) chose to frame the full ratification and implementation of 
CEDAW as a ‘bill of rights for women’ for its key civil society constituents (interview, 
WFW1, 30 July 2008). The different articles of CEDAW were linked to different articles of 
the Beijing Platform for Action (PFA), in order to contextualise and illustrate the nature of 
discrimination faced by women. This helped to concretise the issue at the grassroots 
level. A WFW member explained the process: 
 
[W]e worked on CEDAW, where it came from, what does it say, how would women 
benefit. We went to the field. The first question we got was ‘what is CEDAW?’ we 
started by saying it was a dalil (legal document), and they thought it was a deed for 
land! So we decided to link it to women’s rights issues, to the PFA… (interview, 
WFW3, 30 July 2008). 
 
When presenting to the state, WFW deliberately chose to take a “legalistic” approach in 
framing the issue. This was to avoid any accusations of being anti-Islamic and to create 
space for negotiation. The full ratification of CEDAW and the obligation to ensure gender 
equality were presented as mandatory since the state is a signatory to the Convention. A 
WFW member observed: 
 
Our arguments are not based on emotions and nor are they targeted to evoke any 
emotional response, but to convince a person through logical argument…Our 
examples show how the religious personal laws can be discriminatory; why the 
government is accountable under CEDAW to address gender inequality… We 
used the Constitution to argue our case…we approached the government/state 
diplomatically, keeping the pressure on, because of the conservative elements… 
(interview, WFW1, 30 July 2008) 
 
WFW was able to keep pressure on the bureaucrats until the early 2000s, although it is 
now decreasing, without incurring any backlash from fundamentalist quarters. Personal 
connections may have influenced this. However, the stress on the state being under 
international legal obligation and on secularism have limited this issue to concerned 
women’s groups, particular state officials, and certain sections of civil society. It has not 
been accepted by any of the political parties as a mainstream issue, neither has it been 
included in the wider civil society arena. 
 
The organisations were successful in creating solidarity and support amongst their allies 
and other civil society groups due to only “like-minded” groups being approached and 
packaging the issues in an uncontroversial manner. In negotiating with the state, the 
strategies helped the organisations avoid controversy and afforded them access, 
particularly as officials saw the issues as worthwhile and unthreatening. This indicates 
that the organisations correctly assessed how to appeal to the State, and a clear 
analysis of the national and international context.  
 
However, the ‘packaging’ strategies have had limited impact on creating space for a 
“women’s agenda” within the political parties. This is largely due to these issues 
remaining costly to address politically and to the implications that political associations 
may have for these women’s organisations.  
 
5. Alliance building with civil society: reciprocity, legitimacy and hierarchy  
The three organisations created alliances with civil society organisations, particularly 
women’s organisations, as a means of building support for their issue, and strengthening 
the case that they were advocating, thus increasing pressure on the state. In the context 
of a polarised civil society alliance building is risky since the legitimacy of an 
organisation is affected by whom it includes as an ally and trusts. An unspoken but 
implicit principle for entering into and forming alliances is that of reciprocity. These 
factors fuel the need to control and set the agenda and create tensions within the 
alliances. The legitimacy of an organisation to form an alliance and bring together a 
group of organisations around a specific issue has to be established. This also brings in 
the question of hierarchy with certain organisations having more weight through greater 
resources in terms of information, connections, mobilisation potential, visibility, etc. than 
others. 
 
In the case of Naripokkho’s movement against acid violence several types of alliances 
were formed, although these were not consciously created by NP. The most formal 
alliance has been the Acid Survivors Foundation (ASF). The main objective was to bring 
together the organisations working to combat acid violence while coordinating and 
bringing together the services and advocacy that was needed by the acid survivors. NP 
decided that the role of service provision was not a part of its mandate but wished to 
ensure that an advocacy platform be built around this. There were mixed views around 
the role the ASF would play, and NP was left feeling sidelined in the design and running 
of the foundation, despite being one of its initiators.  
 
NP members and volunteers also promoted the building of networks among survivors, 
the main objective being to contribute to their sense of empowerment and facilitating the 
transition from being victims to being survivors. This networking is continuing among the 
survivors. 
  
Strategically alliances were created with the media to ensure more positive coverage. 
Although first attracted by the news value and sensationalism of the issue, some media 
institutions became genuinely committed to combating acid violence. Prothom Alo, a 
national daily, has since created a fund from which they make regular grants to acid 
survivors. Internally NP had to struggle with issues of how the women would be 
represented and whether the sensationalisation would objectify them, but the survivors 
themselves wanted the media attention and felt in control of the interactions. The 
protection NP had wanted to give was neither needed nor wanted! (interview, NP4, 2 
December 2008).  
 
Other alliances formed included those with doctors and international organisations which 
served to mobilise resources for the acid survivors. A number of doctors, both in 
Bangladesh and overseas, as well as institutions such as the Dhaka Medical College 
Hospital and Gonoshasthya Kendro Hospital, became committed to providing care for 
the victims on a voluntary basis and this even lead to the creation of a specialised burn 
unit at Dhaka Medical College Hospital.  
 
For BMP, the Shamajik Protirodh Committee (SPC or Social Resistance Committee) 
was set up in 2001 in response to the then electoral violence against minorities. This 
then took on the issue of women’s political empowerment. BMP felt that they would be 
stronger and less exposed to backlash if they were joined by other organisations. These 
alliances were seen as instrumental and context specific. A BMP member said ‘If a 
strong democratic government were to come along then slowly this platform will dissolve 
… it won’t be as essential’. (interview, BMP3, 29 July 2008)  
 
BMP recognises that there are issues on which the SPC members respond more easily 
and on which they can have joint positions. There would seem to be an increasing 
acceptance of differences of approach. There are attempts to negotiate, discuss and 
come to common understandings. When asked if there were conflicts between different 
organisations the response was ‘Each organisation deals with various issues in their 
own way. There are differences’. (interview, BMP3, 29 July 2008). However it was 
perceived that now the organisations were more willing to work with each other: 
 
Organisations have a more similar understanding of issues than before and 
perhaps the context has brought together organisations and helped them to work 
together. There is a greater unity among the organisations now. (…) There is 
greater maturity now and demands are stronger ... The blockages from 
government i.e. not keeping their promises, has raised people’s awareness. (…) 
the alliance between organisations, the coalition has become much stronger 
(interview, BMP1, 14 July 2008).   
 
BMP have been successful in garnering media interest in women’s political participation. 
The media follow developments around the issue and can amplify the efforts of the 
women’s organisations and hold up to public scrutiny the role the parties or the 
government plays or does not play in furthering women’s interests. 
  
WFW has formed and participated in fewer alliances than the other two organisations. 
One major exception was the work they did to reach out to women’s organisations 
during the pre- and post-Beijing process, including grass-roots ones. The results of a 
needs assessment process showed that there was a lack of information on the Beijing 
process and CEDAW. In response the National Committee for Beijing Preparations 
(NCBP) was created which later transformed into the National Committee for Beijing 
Plus.  
 
The NCBP network created an outreach for WFW. They saw the NCBP members as 
allies who believed in the same issues. At national level, WFW has to struggle to 
establish its identity and legitimacy to lead on a particular issue (as do other national 
level women’s organisations), but little contestation comes from the organisations 
outside Dhaka who are happy to be included in as many alliances as possible.   
 
Problems related to smooth functioning do not take place with organisations based 
outside of Dhaka. However, the problems rise with Dhaka based organisations. 
These organisations at times do not focus on the larger picture but want to 
highlight their own achievements. There is conflict over ‘who owns’ the issue. So 
the network is not as supportive as it could have been. (interview, WFW1, 30 July 
2008).   
 
Another alliance related to CEDAW that WFW belongs to is the Citizen’s Initiative for 
CEDAW which drafted the Alternative report for the CEDAW Committee for 2009. This 
enables WFW to be part of a larger group where they can influence the analysis of the 
country context and progress using the CEDAW conceptual framework and can also use 
the platform to lobby for the removal of remaining reservations to CEDAW. 
 
While WFW has contacts in the media and working relations with the Nari Sangabik 
Kendra (Women Journalists Centre) for whom WFW has provided training, there is 
disappointment that their alliance with the media is not stronger and that the media has 
not taken on a more proactive and progressive role (interview WFW2, 16 August 2008).  
 
We can see that the strategy of forming alliances is a common one with varied degrees 
of specialisation, sustainability, institutionalisation and effectiveness. These alliances 
have given the organisations additional visibility and credibility and increased their 
outreach beyond their organisational membership to smaller and often local level 
organisations with mutual benefits to each (Goetz and Hassim 2003). Expectations of 
mutual benefit and an unspoken principle of reciprocity have motivated members. Both 
NP and BMP were conscious of differences of opinion within the alliances and made 
conscious efforts to manage and address these differences.  
 
5. Relations with political parties: costs of engagement versus non-engagement  
There are divergent views in the women’s movement about engagement with political 
parties and how far they can protect their autonomous voice. WFW and NP were 
similarly dismissive of the parties and felt they had very little to gain but everything to 
lose from engagement. BMP took the opposite view and saw the parties as allies who 
would espouse their cause. Consequently, they adopted two very different strategies to 
begin with but have now converged more after the BMP’s disillusioning experience. 
 
In spite of the success before the 2001 elections in getting both major parties to agree to 
reserved seats for women, neither party implemented this. The parties perceived the 
costs in terms of loss of male power base to be higher than any potential benefits of 
ensuring women’s effective representation. There has since been a gradual 
disillusionment and a feeling of betrayal as the various political parties have failed to 
deliver. ‘Now we do not attend the meetings of the two big political parties. The nature of 
politics has changed. But we now have our own politics … the women’s movement has 
its own politics’ (interview, BMP3, 29 July 2008). 
 
Strategically BMP still continues to work with the centrist and leftist parties and are 
willing to work with the party in power, trying to identify the right people to talk to. 
However, there is regret that none of the parties lives up to their expectations. The 
parties that BMP members feel reflect their political positions are felt to be very weak or 
even insignificant.  
 
For both NP and WFW, they were concerned about losing credibility if they engaged with 
the parties. In the polarised national context mentioned previously the organisations 
have had to ‘jealously guard their non-partisan position’ (interview NP4, 2 December 
2008) and fight off party labels that have been applied to them from time to time.  
 NP consciously avoided engaging with political parties. An interviewee pointed out that 
the organisation ‘did not know how to speak the language the politicians would 
understand’ (interview, NP4, 2 December 2008). They did, however, interact with local 
politicians and found it easier to engage on concrete issues rather than with the national 
level party and its politics. NP sees this avoidance as a common failing of feminist 
organisations.  
 
WFW also acknowledged that their relationship with political parties was weak. ‘We were 
unable to use political contacts. We tried many ways through NCBP, we arranged 
seminars, but never got their support’ (interview, WFW2, 16 August 2008). There was no 
follow up. 
 
In conclusion, the organisations were all negative about the political parties and their 
lack of responsiveness and commitment to gender equality in general and to the issues 
they were pursuing. The political parties also do not seem to consider the women’s 
organisations as part of their constituency and do not feel the need to justify their actions 
or lack thereof. BMP’s agenda on political participation has become part of party rhetoric 
but there does not seem to be any real commitment towards it. CEDAW has not entered 
the political vocabulary. However issues of violence against women are increasingly 
addressed in the documents of the parties but whether this is in response to the 
women’s organisations’ demands or to the wider social mobilisation, is not clear. 
 
While there might have been costs of engaging with political parties there are costs of 
not engaging with them. The influencing potential of the women’s organisations is limited 
and they do not have the access to the mainstream political party agenda. In the face of 
the current stalemate in relations with the parties, none of the three organisations seem 
to have come up with any new forms of engagement.  
 
6. Engagement with the state: opportunism or pragmatism?  
The women’s movement in Bangladesh has strong views about engagement with the 
state, on what terms, for what purposes and also which state. Before 1990, the debate 
focused on whether engagement with an autocratic state meant legitimising it? Now, it 
has shifted to how and what types of engagement with the state can bring about greater 
accountability, responsiveness and change. This shift is in the context of a “Third World 
State” which is the main development actor and responsible for the fulfilment of various 
responsibilities. 
 
For WFW, especially on an issue such as CEDAW, the state had the primary role to 
play. WFW was able to benefit from close relations with the bureaucracy and from the 
presence of their own members in positions of influence at crucial points in time. The 
argument for the full implementation of CEDAW was based on a reference to the 
national Constitution. WFW showed that it was in the Government’s interest to first ratify 
CEDAW, then regularly report on it and move towards removing the remaining 
reservations. International reputation has always been important to the Government, 
whichever the party in power, and the costs were perceived to be limited since it has 
been able to sign such conventions without needing to implement them in national laws 
or policies. The women’s organisations have tried to increase the costs by using the 
CEDAW Committee platform to publicly shame the government for not living up to its 
promises to remove the reservations and undertake modification of national laws to be in 
conformity with CEDAW. 
  
The rationale behind NP’s strategy to make the state responsible for ensuring women’s 
rights is sustainability: ‘Because we might be here today as an organisation (and gone 
tomorrow), but the government machineries will stay…’ (interview, NP3, 14 September 
2008). One of the interviewees explained: ‘We were not against the state. Our role was 
to enable the state. So the issue was developing capacity’ (interview, NP3, 14 
September 2008). They felt that public offices needed to be strengthened and 
encouraged to deal with cases of acid violence. An interviewee explained: ‘We cannot 
create an alternative system. We need to fix the (existing) system’ (interview, NP3, 14 
September 2008).  
 
Invariably, influencing the government is difficult, time-consuming and laborious. 
Experience has shown that there is a big gap between policy and implementation and 
that unless there is constant pressure, many of the legal or policy level gains remain on 
paper. NP’s strategy emphasised the creation of working relations with various levels of 
the state – e.g. police and hospitals. A member commented on government officials’ 
responsiveness to the issue of acid violence and felt that it was much more than the 
organisation had experienced before (which can be explained by the framing of the 
issue) and thought that “active citizenship” can lead to a qualitative improvement in 
services (interview, NP4, 2 December 2008). 
 
Coming from a political background, BMP found it harder to engage with the state, 
especially during periods when they did not approve of the political ideology of the 
regime. After initial reluctance, BMP decided to work strategically with the state 
apparatus and continued to take up opportunities to petition and lobby the state. An 
interviewee explained: 
 
…If we want to change laws then we have to go to the “State apparatus”. We will 
have to approach the PM and ministers. We cannot avoid the state structure to 
bring about such changes… (interview, BMP2, 18 July 2008).   
 
The pressure was kept up despite their reluctance to engage and fears of being 
negatively received: ‘kanai diaichi tula, pithai bendhaichi kula’ (we shut our ears with 
cotton and padded our back against blows; interview, BMP2, 18 July 2008). 
 
BMP interviewees pointed out that the state acknowledges them as legitimate 
spokespeople for the women’s movement: ‘We are sometimes called by the State to 
give our opinions on various subjects e.g. the Women’s Development Policy’ (interview, 
BMP1, 14 July 2008). However, on the issue of political empowerment the State never 
called BMP but they have approached the state:  
 
We have worked with all the political governments. In the last government, we 
were never able to meet the Prime Minister but her Law Minister. In the AL 
government, we were able to meet the Prime Minister. The impact in both cases 
was nil. But for a demand such as ours we had to approach the government... 
(interview, BMP2, 18 July 2008). 
 
All three organisations have been able to engage strategically and substantively with the 
state and bring about various changes. They have tried to establish state responsibilities 
in a number of areas, recognising that some issues can only be done by the state. For 
WFW it has meant using the opportunities afforded by the CEDAW reporting procedures 
to follow-up on full ratification and implementation. For NP, engagement was at various 
levels and in various forms: from service monitoring to policy advocacy. For BMP, it 
meant sustaining the movement with whatever party came into power. The organisations 
have been both pragmatic and opportunistic in their engagement, and the state would 
seem to be dealing with them in the same manner, calling on them as and when needed 
and choosing to ignore them when it suited them to do so. 
 
7. Personal networks: access and sustainability issues 
Given the social and political context of Bangladeshi society, personal networks 
emerged as a key tool that all three organisations used for access. In movement 
building, personal networks play an important role in determining who decides to join 
(Tarrow 1998). Personal connections, either familial or other types, create a sense of 
obligation to reciprocate and evoke trust, which are key factors in influencing people to 
act. In the case of the three organisations, the networks helped to open up policy and 
organisational spaces to present their case.   
 
NP used personal networks to approach the state to overcome initial resistance in 
accessing state service provision; to manage disagreements among the service 
providers about NP’s role; and to create an immediate impact on the issue. Initially, NP’s 
proposal to monitor health care service providers and police stations was resisted by 
government employees. They feared that monitoring could reveal failings. However, the 
members’ personal relations with hospital and police heads ensured the required 
permission:  
 
We had gained access because X or Y knew someone – either the law minister or 
the health secretary or the senior physician… [W]e knew we had to get the BIG 
heads first to agree with what we were doing. The initial meetings were difficult and 
chaotic as each group - doctors, lawyers, police, blamed the other… (interview, 
NP2, 10 September 2008) 
 
Many of the WFW members are academics and have family or former students working 
within the state bureaucracy and this created an opportunity for them to lobby key 
people. A WFW member explained: 
 
All of us have links with the bureaucracy… [A] lot of the government secretaries 
are our students. Some of them were our juniors (studied at the same university). 
Our family members work as state officials. We used that network… If we asked 
for a meeting, if we made a request …they could not just overlook it. (Interview, 
WFW1, 30 July 2008) 
 
Moreover, in the 1990s when WFW started working on CEDAW, many of the WFW 
members were in key positions. This allowed them to bring up gender equity issues in 
various state forums, build rapport with key officials and identify obstacles. One WFW 
member observed: 
 
We had the right people in the right places. They were in strategic positions… We 
were in the Planning Commission, also working in donor agencies. We were able 
to bring in gender issues at different levels of policymaking process. Since we 
were in key positions, we did not face bureaucratic resistance. We could 
negotiate… (interview, WFW2, 16 August 2008) 
 
Interviewees from BMP pointed out that in dealings with the state, personal networks is 
the primary strategy that produces results. Garnering support among the political parties 
was also done on the basis of personal networks. One interviewee explained that 
personal connections with party leadership were used on a strategic basis: 
  
We try and work with people who are progressive within the party, whom we may 
have known… (interview, BMP2, 18 July 2008).      
 
The presence of particular individuals within a group determined whether BMP would 
ask them for co-operation. The interviewees explained that this selection approach was 
due to the partisan nature of Bangladeshi civil society and the cost it implies. One BMP 
member commented: 
 
We do not approach groups, we approach individuals who are progressive, who 
believe in women’s empowerment... Given that a lot of the groups can be partisan, 
our allies are not groups but specific persons who we can trust…” (interview, 
BMP2, 18 July 2008). 
 Interestingly, NP and WFW interviewees did not categorically state that they approached 
allied organisations based on who were in these organisations, but based their selection 
on what types of services these organisations could provide to the core constituents. 
However, the effectiveness of NP or WFW within these alliances and the nature of the 
relationship with allies are influenced by personal relations that induced trust and a 
sense of obligation. Personal networks have expedited the process of accessing the 
state, and in certain cases ensured collaborative relations. However, they have not been 
effective for dealing with political party leadership. This is partly due to the fact that for 
some organisations, such as WFW, the party leaders were not from the same social 
background. Despite their use of personal networks, BMP’s experience shows that they 
were marginalised in mainstream politics.   
 
The above discussion raises questions about the impact personal networks have on 
issues such as sustainability and the success of a movement. Undeniably, the strength 
of personal networks facilitated advocacy and aided mutual reciprocity in building 
alliances. It also was effective in mobilising insiders within the state structure and 
overcoming resistance within state bureaucracy. However, it may also adversely 
influence sustainability and effectiveness, if gains made in negotiating with the state or 
political parties rely on personal links with individuals, if the individuals leave then the 
organisations’ effectiveness may diminish. All interviewees recounted instances where 
this has been the case. In spite of these risks in the context of Bangladesh this remains 
an effective strategy.  
 
10. Conclusions 
We sought to gain insights about constituency building strategies and their outcome 
through in depth analysis of three women’s organisations. Our analysis shows that 
strategic packaging and engagement with supporters/allies have allowed these 
organisations to establish legitimacy of voice and space for a particular issue. Their 
strategic engagement allowed them to promote demands for gender justice and mobilise 
a wider audience than their own membership and like-minded groups. The fact that they 
were able to make opposing these agendas difficult for other organisations shows the 
strength of the constituency building process. 
 
Though these organisations mobilised supporters for different causes, their strategies in 
dealing with the state, political parties and other civil society groups were similar. It is 
this similarity that draws attention to the importance of wider contextual factors, i.e., 
polarised civil society, nature of the state etc, that influence the decisions of 
organisations in movement building. Alliance building is not without issue, the power 
asymmetries and how concerns for legitimacy fuel the need of the larger organisations to 
control the agenda setting process, indicate the influence of these factors. Equally 
personal networks, although playing a key role in mobilising on an issue, raise questions 
about sustainability. Moreover, non- or ineffective engagement with political parties has 
had certain costs in terms of reducing influence.  
 
All the organisations studied had a broad understanding of their constituencies. This 
included membership, NGOs, civil society, state officials, political party leaders and the 
media. This particular way of understanding is a departure from how traditional 
membership based organisations identify their constituencies. The strategies of 
packaging and alliance building were influenced by this understanding. The 
organisations sought to reach out to these diverse groups and bring them on their side. 
This entailed making certain compromises, such as how issues were ‘named and 
framed’ and how meanings were negotiated with allies. This left certain issues out of the 
public debate which perhaps needed to be raised. However, these well chosen 
compromises help the organisations to create space and legitimacy both for the issue or 
agenda put forward.  
 
The strategies used to mobilise support and build constituencies in favour of the specific 
demands contributed towards advancing the agenda for women’s empowerment in 
Bangladesh. The analysis has shown that while doing so they also gained greater 
legitimacy and strength for themselves as advocates of women’s interests. Strategies for 
empowering women need to take into account the role played by such organisations as 
mediators and channels of women’s voice and demands, and therefore appropriately 
acknowledged and supported.  
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